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Abstract in English 
It is widely believed that wage and productivity profiles of individual workers do not coincide 
at all ages. We give an overview of the theories which provide a rationale for this, and discuss 
the empirical literature. Human capital theories typically imply that wages rise with tenure, so 
that job reallocation at old age would imply a wage cut. Incentive theories typically imply that 
wages exceed productivity at the end of a worker’s career. Bargaining power of unions may 
also lead to ‘overpayment’ of older workers. Some general conclusions regarding the wages of 
older workers are formulated on basis of the authors’ reading of the empirical literature. 
 
Key words: age, wage, productivity 
 
JEL code: J24, J31, J33, J51, J62 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
De gedachte dat loon en productiviteit van individuele werknemers niet voor alle leeftijden 
gelijk zijn, is wijdverspreid. We geven een overzicht van economische theorieën die verschillen 
tussen loon en productiviteit rechtvaardigen. Voorts bespreken we de empirische literatuur. 
Theorieën die de opbouw van menselijk kapitaal centraal stellen, impliceren in de regel dat 
individuele lonen stijgen met de duur van het dienstverband. Daardoor zien oudere werknemers 
een loondaling tegemoet indien zij overwegen om van baan te veranderen. Theorieën die de  
prestatieprikkel voor werknemers centraal stellen, impliceren meestal dat de lonen van oudere 
werknemers hun productiviteit overstijgen. Onderhandelingsmacht van vakbonden kan 
eveneens leiden tot relatief hoge lonen van oudere werknemers. Op basis van lezing van de 
empirische literatuur formuleren de auteurs enkele algemene conclusies. 
 
Steekwoorden: leeftijd, loon, productiviteit 
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Summary 
The labour market is not a spot market. Instead, supply, demand and price may be the result of 
complex contracts that seek to deal with various market imperfections. An important 
implication is that the productivity and wage of an individual worker's do not necessarily 
coincide at all ages. This has important implications. First, discrepancies between wage and 
productivity over the life cycle cause redistribution between generations through implicit pay-
as-you-go transfers. This may be unsustainable in light of the ageing population (Lazear, 1988). 
Second, discrepancies affect the labour-market position at different ages. For instance, current 
payment schemes may hamper the hiring of older workers to the extent that they are overpaid 
compared to their productivity (Hutchens, 1986; Daniel and Heywood, 2007; Heywood et al., 
2010). Third, while payment schemes may be based on optimal private decisions of workers 
and employers, they are not necessarily socially optimal due to external effects that they create. 
To understand the possible discrepancies between productivity and wages, this paper offers 
a survey of the literature aimed at explaining them. Thereby, we focus on older workers. We 
discuss several theories, including incentive theories, human capital theory, and imperfect 
labour market theories. Most of these theories have been developed during the 1970s and 1980s. 
In recent decades, researchers have started to test these theories. We summarize the consensus 
results that can be derived from this empirical literature. Early empirical studies use individual 
cross-section and longitudinal data, without making a direct link to firm productivity. Later 
studies have started to make use of matched employer-employee data to relate firm productivity 
and wages to the firm's worker-age composition. Moreover, empirical studies have started to 
perform experiments and surveys to complement other empirical methods. Overall, we 
collected 70 studies, primarily from the US and Europe. While they do not allow deriving 
conclusions for individual countries, sectors, firms, or individuals, they do offer insights that 
justify some general conclusions.  
Theories emphasizing specific human capital are able to explain why firms employ older 
workers but hardly ever hire them. The evidence grants support to this theory and it seems 
particularly important at the early stages of careers. However, its precise relevance is still 
subject to debate. In the empirical literature, there are strong indications that this theory alone 
cannot explain the wage patterns of older workers, and that at least one other theory should be 
added to allow for proper explanations of wage profiles. For instance, studies allowing for both 
specific human capital and deferred payment schemes gain some support. Moreover, theories 
that emphasize insurance, collective bargaining, and workers' preferences also receive some 
support from the data. Hence, it is unlikely that just one theory explains the wage-productivity 
gap for all older workers.  
Different theories arrive at different outcomes regarding the optimality of wage profiles. In 
some theories, a wage-productivity gap is socially desirable, especially when firms and workers 
find it optimal to conclude such a payment scheme without imposing external costs on others.   8 
In principle, this is the case in, for instance, Lazear style implicit contracts, worker preferences 
theory, and insurance theories. However, deferred compensation schemes may be inefficient if 
they aggravate problems of liquidity constrained young households or discourage job-to-job 
mobility at old age. Moreover, wage bargaining theories emphasize inefficiencies of wage 
contracts due to monopsony power of trade unions. As a result, the normative implications of 
the different theories may differ importantly.  
    9 
1  Introduction 
The labour market is not a spot market. Instead, supply, demand and price may be the result of 
complex contracts that seek to deal with various market imperfections. An important 
implication is that the productivity and wage of an individual worker's do not necessarily 
coincide at all ages. This has important implications. First, discrepancies between wage and 
productivity over the life cycle cause redistribution between generations through implicit pay-
as-you-go transfers. This may be unsustainable in light of the ageing population (Lazear, 1988). 
Second, discrepancies affect the labour-market position at different ages. For instance, current 
payment schemes may hamper the hiring of older workers to the extent that they are overpaid 
compared to their productivity (Hutchens, 1986; Daniel and Heywood, 2007; Heywood et al., 
2010). Third, while payment schemes may be based on optimal private decisions of workers 
and employers, they are not necessarily socially optimal due to external effects that they create. 
To understand the possible discrepancies between productivity and wages, this paper offers 
a survey of the literature aimed at explaining them. Thereby, we focus on older workers. We 
discuss several theories, including incentive theories, human capital theory, and imperfect 
labour market theories. Most of these theories have been developed during the 1970s and 1980s. 
In recent decades, researchers have started to test these theories. We summarize the consensus 
results that can be derived from this empirical literature. Early empirical studies use individual 
cross-section and longitudinal data, without making a direct link to firm productivity. Later 
studies have started to make use of matched employer-employee data to relate firm productivity 
and wages to the firm's worker-age composition. Moreover, empirical studies have started to 
perform experiments and surveys to complement other empirical methods. Overall, we 
collected more than 70 studies, primarily from the US and Europe. While they do not allow 
deriving conclusions for individual countries, sectors, firms, or individuals, they do offer 
insights that justify some general conclusions.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses theories providing 
explanations for wages being unequal to productivity. Section 3 discusses the main empirical 
findings. Section 4 concludes.   10   11 
2  Theories explaining wages of older workers 
We discuss theories which predict deviations from wages that would be realised in a spot 
market. First, we focus on human capital theory, which generally predicts that wages are above 
the spot market wage but below the worker’s value to the firm. Second, we discuss deferred 
compensation schemes, which often imply that older workers are paid above their productivity 
within the firm. We also discuss three alternative theories. Collective bargaining and worker 
preferences may lead to wages rising with seniority, implying that wages exceed productivity as 
workers near the end of their careers. Insurance may lead employers to offer stable wage 
profiles. At times, this may imply that wages deviate from worker productivity. The effect may 
go both ways, so that according to these theories older workers could be either under- or 
overpaid compared to their productivity. 
2.1  Human capital investment in long-term employment relationships 
2.1.1  General and specific capital investment 
Investments in human capital increase the individual worker’s productivity, and most usually 
also his earnings. After completion of schooling, formal or informal on-the-job training is the 
major productivity-enhancing investment. Human capital theory distinguishes between 
investments in general and specific skills (Becker, 1964). General skills are equally valuable in 
any employee-firm match, whereas specific skills are valuable only for a particular match. In a 
competitive labour market, employers share the returns and the costs of investments in firm-
specific skills with their employees. Moreover, firms do not invest in general skills of their 
employees. Employees capture all the returns to their general human capital, and as a result 
make this investment themselves. Mincer (1970; 1997) summarizes the empirical evidence, and 
finds that earnings depend positively on the stock of human capital; the age-earnings profile is 
at least for a long time upward sloping, at a decreasing rate; and the age-earnings profile 
becomes steeper and has its maximum later if investment in human capital increases. 
Another approach to human capital investment assumes that investment levels are not 
contractible and that post-training wages are determined by bargaining. This strand of the 
literature recognizes that there are problems in writing contracts contingent on future events that 
are important for the employment relationship, including investments. With specific 
investments (in human and/or physical capital) demand and supply conditions do not determine 
a unique equilibrium wage, but instead determine the lowest wage for which an employee is 
willing to work and the highest wage the employer is willing to pay. In the absence of an 
explicit contract, bargaining determines where between those two the wage lies, and thus how 
the rents to continued employment are divided. If the size or division of the rents depends on 
the return to an investment undertaken by a firm, ex-post bargaining may result in the employee 
capturing some of that return. This is called hold-up. As a result, the firm will under-invest in   12 
specific capital (Grout, 1984). Similarly, the employee will under-invest in his specific (human) 
capital if part of the return to that investment is captured by the firm. This constitutes a market 
failure: hold-up implies underinvestment in human capital, leading to lower levels of 
employment.  
Replacing an employee with someone equally good may involve hiring costs. Similarly, 
moving to another comparable job often involves search and relocation costs for the employee. 
With hiring costs, the impact of any investment, specific or general, on the alternative wage of 
the employee is always less than its impact on the firm’s net revenue. This provides the firm 
with an incentive to invest in general skills. The similarity with specific capital is evident. 
Turnover costs can be seen as a rent which can be shared between the worker and the firm. 
Thus, underinvestment is not only a problem with specific human capital, but also with general 
human capital (Shaked and Sutton, 1984; Stevens, 1994; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999).
1  
In the following, we first discuss contracts that may (to a certain extent) protect investments 
from hold-up. Second, we examine the consequences of these contracts for the wage profiles of 
individual workers. 
2.1.2  Contracts to induce investment in general and specific capital 
Employee wages often rise with tenure as a result of such contracts which induce human capital 
investment by the firm and/or employee. The main results are summarised in table 1. A "firm 
sets wage" contract implies that the wage equals the outside option of the employee. Because 
the wage is independent from specific investments and fully reflects general investments, the 
firm invests efficiently in specific skills and the employee invests efficiently in general skills. 
As a result, wages do not rise with tenure. An "employee sets wage" contract, on the contrary, 
implies that the wage equals the outside option of the firm. Because the wage fully reflects both 
general and specific investments, the employee invests efficiently in both general and specific 
skills, and the tenure effect is positive. In a "fixed wage" contract, the wage rate is fixed, and 
the firm has an incentive to invest in general and specific skills. However, it will not invest 
efficiently due to the probability of renegotiation. At times of renegotiation the employee may 
capture (a part of) the returns on the investment. It is precisely this prospect of wage adjustment 
that provides an incentive for the employee to invest positively in general and specific skills. 
Whereas the investments in general skills raise the outside opportunities for the employee, and 
– with high enough investments – will likely lead to renegotiation, investments in specific skills 
will only pay off in times of downward renegotiations. As downward wage adjustments are 
unlikely, the investment in specific skills by the employee and the accompanying tenure effect 
are small. 
A "firm sets wage" contract results in no specific investments by the employee, while the 
firm invests efficiently. Conversely, an "employee sets wage" contract implies efficient 
 
1 Alternatively, complementarities between general and specific capital may also lead to firm investments in general capital 
(see, e.g., Franz and Soskice, 1995).   13 
investments by the employee, but results in no investments by the firm. That is, either the firm 
or the employee invests efficiently while the other invests not at all. In some circumstances, it 
may however be more efficient to have both parties invest some positive amount than for one to 
invest efficiently and the other not at all. This is the case if both parties have access to different 
investment opportunities (with diminishing returns). This may e.g. be the case if an investment 
requires effort from the employee. A firm will not invest in a training course if the employee 
does not provide effort. A fixed wage contract can typically induce both to make some specific 
investment. In this way, a fixed wage contract can be an improvement over other types of 
contracts. 
Table 2.1  Investment in human capital, and tenure effect on wages 
Type of contract  Type of investment         Investment by
a  Tenure effect 
    Firm  Employee   
         
no contract  general  0  efficient   
  specific  +  +  + 
no contract, turnover costs  general  +  +   
  specific  +  +  + 
firm sets wage  general  0  efficient   
  specific  efficient  0  0 
Employee sets wage  general  0  efficient   
  specific  0  efficient  + 
Fixed wage  general  +  +   
  specific  +  +  +
b 
 
a A ‘+’ indicates a generally lower than efficient investment. 
b A fixed wage contract implies only a small positive tenure effect when downward renegotiation occurs. 
 
2.1.3  Implications for wage profiles 
General human capital is expected to accumulate with total job market experience, and fall in 
later stages as depreciation dominates investments in skills. Wages initially increase with 
experience to the extent that the employee is able to capture the return to these investments. As 
a result, differences in individual wages reflect differences in productivity. Specific human 
capital can be expected to accumulate with tenure with a given employer. Wages then increase 
with tenure to the extent that an employee is able to capture some of the return to this capital. 
Or, in other words, wages grow during periods in which on-the-job training occurs. If specific 
human capital is an important factor in wage growth, firms will be less inclined to hire older 
workers (who lack those specific skills). For instance, Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) predict 
both an experience premium – as wages are higher during the later career of workers because of 
the investments in skills during the early years – and a tenure premium – because market 
frictions make these skills partly specific.  
In a frictional labour market with on-the-job search, in which firms can post general 
contracts, firms may use contracts in which the value to the worker increases with tenure 
(Burdett and Coles, 2003; Stevens, 2004). This may happen either instantaneously, by means of   14 
an entrance fee, or slowly if entrance fees are not possible, by means of a rising wage. Such 
contracts increase the retention of existing workers (and hence reduce labour market turnover), 
and allow the firm to extract rents. The firm’s benefits of retention are even higher in the case 
of specific capital investments – to the extent that the firm captures the returns on these 
investments. Firms may actually choose increasing wage-tenure contracts, such as back-loaded 
compensation and generous pensions, so as to invest in specific capital and retain their workers 
at the firm. 
Two implications of these human capital explanations for the wage-seniority relationship 
deserve emphasis. First, wages grow with seniority because productivity grows with seniority 
(experience and/or tenure). Second, at least for older (trained) workers, the spot wage is always 
less than or equal to the spot value of the marginal product within the firm.  
2.2  Incentive contracts 
Employers may stimulate the individual worker’s productivity by offering him a deferred 
compensation scheme. That is, the worker earns a relatively high wage compared to his 
productivity near retirement. In this section we first briefly discuss the problem of verifiability 
of worker productivity. Next, we discuss how worker effort can be stimulated in this case. The 
typical solution is an implicit contract between the firm and the worker where worker effort – as 
subjectively assessed by the firm – is rewarded by some form of deferred compensation. This 
may imply wages exceeding productivity for older workers. 
2.2.1  Individual productivity and the implicit contract 
If the productivity of an individual worker can be observed without much cost, then 
commission or piece-rate schemes directly based on output can be used in order to stimulate 
effort. However, such explicit labour contracts are rare. According to Milgrom and Roberts 
(1992; p. 329), an employment contract : “is typically quite imprecise. The employees agree 
that within limits that are rarely completely described and only partly understood they will use 
their minds and muscles to undertake the tasks that the employer directs them to do. The 
employer agrees to pay the employees. The range of actions that might be requested or required 
is unclear.” This implicit nature of labour contracts is a consequence of several practical issues. 
First, workers typically perform multiple tasks. Inducing the right amount of effort for each task 
would require an intricate explicit labour contract, and high monitoring costs for the firm. 
Second, it is hard to imagine a contract which adequately defines the amount of effort to be 
dedicated to each task. Output-based contracts are in practice typically focused on tasks which 
are easiest or cheapest to measure, and this induces employees to reallocate their activities 
precisely towards these tasks (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1990; Baker, 1992). Third, it is 
practically impossible to foresee all the events that might possibly arise over time, and 
unambiguously describe these events and the actions that should be taken in the explicit labour   15 
contract. A fourth fundamental problem with output-based payment schemes is that third parties 
may not be able to verify the performance of individual workers, so that such schemes cannot 
be enforced by legal courts. That is, even if worker output is observable by the firm, then 
output-based payment schemes may be infeasible because of this non-verifiability problem. 
Apart from these practical reasons, implicit labour contracts facilitate dynamic wage incentives 
in order to stimulate worker productivity. 
2.2.2  Early incentive theories  
In order to stimulate worker effort, the employer could offer a higher wage than the worker’s 
alternative source of income and at the same time threaten him with dismissal in case he does 
not meet performance conditions set by the employer (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). While wages 
are above the market clearing level, there is involuntary unemployment. The relatively high 
wage combined with the threat of unemployment stimulates the worker to maximize his output. 
Some empirical support for this theory of efficiency wages can be found in, amongst others, 
Krueger and Summers (1988) and Krueger (1991). However, a problem with efficiency wages 
is that the incentive to perform becomes smaller as the worker becomes older. From a career 
perspective, it is therefore more attractive for the employer to allocate the wage premium in 
later periods. Such a wage premium may come in several forms, e.g. occupational pension 
schemes, early retirement schemes, or simply a relatively high wage during the final periods 
prior to retirement. In a stylized model, Becker and Stigler (1974) demonstrate that a wage 
premium in the last period, combined with the threat of dismissal in case of detected 
malfeasance, is sufficient to motivate the worker over his entire career with the firm.  
Such a payment scheme however only works if the employee trusts the employer that the 
firm’s assessment takes place under fair conditions, and that the outcome is in accordance with 
that assessment. Legal enforcement of the payment scheme is in general not possible, because 
worker effort is not verifiable by third parties. In principle, the firm could thus be tempted to 
cheat on the worker in the last period by claiming that he has not shown enough effort, firing 
the worker, and keeping the wage premium for itself. Therefore, the worker will only trust the 
firm if it has a good reputation. In fact, in the absence of third parties, firm reputation is 
necessary in order to make deferred compensation schemes feasible (Bull, 1987). Next, the 
question arises why the firm would care about its reputation. The answer is that this can only be 
the case if the firm earns quasi-rents from being in business, i.e. there must be costs attached to 
going out of business, moving the firm’s capital elsewhere, and attracting new workers (Klein 
and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983). The assumption that the firm cares about its reputation is a 
crucial element in all deferred compensation schemes. A firm with a harmed reputation will not 
be able to motivate its employees anymore nor attract new workers. 
A deferred compensation scheme may imply that the worker is disciplined through the 
concept of equilibrium unemployment (as with efficiency wages). It is however often possible 
to construct a wage profile with a more efficient outcome. If workers earn relatively high   16 
wages, then at least some of the unemployed are willing to pay an entrance fee in order to 
obtain a job. On the other hand, the firm may demand entrance fees from newly hired workers 
in order to cut its labour costs. It may do so without demoralizing its workers, as wages in the 
first period do not affect worker effort. If the probability of being caught shirking is small or if 
the worker’s valuation of shirking is large, then paying an entrance fee may imply a net transfer 
from the worker to the firm during the first period. In that case, the scheme resembles a 
‘bonding scheme’, in which the worker is required to post a ‘performance bond’ before work 
begins. Wages equal the worker’s alternative plus interest on the bond. Deferred pay at the end 
of the contract equals the bond itself. In fact, the incentive to perform is then derived from the 
threat that the firm does not pay off the implicit bond to the worker. Thus, a bonding scheme 
does in principle not require wage premiums to stimulate worker effort. 
Explicit entrance fees and performance bonds are however rarely observed in practice. The 
possible absence of entrance fees and performance bonds cannot be explained by liquidity 
constraints of workers as a result of imperfect capital markets. The argument is that whenever 
demanding the perfect entrance fee is not possible, the firm could still ask whatever up-front 
payments workers can make. It is unlikely that workers can make no payment at all, and in fact 
it is very simple to prove that some of them are willing to do so (Carmichael, 1985). The 
possibility of firm cheating – the firm may falsely claim that the worker shirks and keep the 
entrance fee for itself – can also not explain the lack of entrance fees, as it is assumed that firms 
are concerned about their reputations.  This argument will however most likely imply lower 
entrance fees (Dickens et al., 1989). In conclusion, it appears that no convincing arguments 
exist for why firms should not raise entrance fees to newly hired workers. In the next 
subsection, we consider a wage profile with an integrated entrance fee, i.e. one which is 
deducted from the wages during the first years of employment. 
2.2.3  Lazear style implicit contracts 
While the theory just discussed may e.g. explain the existence of pensions, it does not give a 
clear answer on what the typical wage profile would look like. We consider three issues in order 
to link the theory with some stylized empirical facts. First, as was already mentioned in the 
previous subsection, entrance fees (or performance bonds) for newly hired workers are hardly 
observed in practice. While it was argued that there are no sound theoretical reasons for the 
non-existence of entrance fees, it may be the case that entrance fees are somehow integrated 
into the wage profiles of workers. That is, workers are paid less during their first years of 
employment and their implicit performance bond is potentially paid back near the end of their 
careers. Second, several studies have found that relative earnings increase in time although 
relative performance does not. This suggests an increasing wage profile over the life-cycle. 
Third, it has been noted that employers often stimulate their older workers to retire. Lazear 
(1979) specifically pointed at mandatory retirement, which was prevalent in many sectors at 
that time, and to the fact that many pension schemes were actuarially unfair – that is, a financial   17 
penalty was imposed on extending the working life once a certain age was reached. This third 
point suggests that older workers are paid above their productivity level.  
Lazear (1979, 1981, 1983) proposed a payment scheme which connects the theory described 
in the previous section with these empirical facts. Lazear focuses on potential dispersions 
between wages and productivity, rather than between wages and alternatives (as e.g. in 
efficiency wage theory). In fact, he assumes that the worker’s alternative is strictly less than his 
productivity level (prior to retirement). In the general scheme proposed by Lazear, the worker 
implicitly posts a performance bond in the early years of his career by accepting wages below 
his productivity level. Then, wages typically show an increasing pattern during the worker’s 
career, and finally the performance bond is paid out to the worker, for instance in the form of a 
pension. As older workers become relatively expensive in such a payment scheme the firm 
needs to get rid of these older workers in order to sustain the payment scheme. This can e.g. be 
achieved through mandatory retirement or through a (properly devised) defined benefit pension 
plan. The steepness of the payment scheme is closely linked to the probability that the worker is 
caught shirking. A low probability typically implies a steep wage profile (relative to the 
productivity profile), as workers can only be deterred from shirking by the threat of losing 
future payments. An example of the resulting life-cycle wage profile is given in figure 2 in 
Lazear’s article in this special issue. 
A criticism on such Lazear style implicit contracts (LSICs) is that the implicit bonding 
solution is imperfect because young workers do not have the full incentive to perform (Akerlof 
and Katz, 1989). A worker who has just started his career with a firm and did not post the full 
bond yet may find it optimal to shirk, as he does not have that much to lose in case he is caught. 
A counter-argument is that LSICs may imply equilibrium unemployment similar to what was 
theorized in the case of efficiency wages. Another argument in favour of LSICs is that firms 
may offer ‘entry level jobs’ to young workers in order to assess their productivity. These young 
workers are paid below their productivity until they have posted the implicit bond, and at that 
point the worker can be promoted to a job where effort and output are more difficult to observe 
(Neal and Rosen, 2000). It has further been noted that young workers are nowadays less willing 
to post implicit bonds, because lifetime jobs are now quite uncommon. In that case, it will be 
harder for firms to offer LSICs. Finally, LSICs in an ageing workforce may imply more 
redistribution from young workers to old workers. We will come back to these last two issues in 
the concluding section of this paper. 
2.2.4  Tournaments 
The wage growth of workers is for an important part caused by jumps associated with 
promotions. For the U.S., McCue (1996) estimates that between 9 and 18% of the average 
within-firm wage growth over the life cycle is due to promotions. As the worker’s inherent 
skills are likely to remain more or less constant in the short run, it is unlikely that his 
productivity really jumps up on promotion day with a jump equal to that in his wage (Neal and   18 
Rosen, 2000). A possible explanation is derived from tournament theory. In a setting where the 
relative productivity of employees is observable, the employer may reward the worker with the 
highest productivity score with a bonus or promotion to a higher function, and reward the 
second most productive worker with the second highest bonus or promotion, etc. The number of 
bonuses and promotions is fixed beforehand in order to prevent the employer from cheating. 
Contrary to piece rate schemes, tournament compensation schemes offer a practical solution 
to stimulating worker effort when individual output is non-verifiable (Malcomson, 1984; 1986). 
Based on the worker’s relative performance the firm may rank workers on the basis of their 
productivity scores, and assign bonuses accordingly. Workers maximize expected utility by 
choosing the effort level which equates the marginal cost of effort with its marginal benefit. The 
marginal benefit of effort depends on (i) the marginal probability of winning, and (ii) the size of 
the bonus. A firm may thus stimulate effort by increasing either of the two. Most of the 
theoretical literature on tournaments focuses on the determination of the optimal size of the 
bonus (leaving the probability of winning the tournament fixed). If workers are risk-neutral, 
then a tournament may give the optimal incentive to perform (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). 
However, in the more relevant case of risk averse workers, the optimal incentive cannot be 
obtained by a tournament (Mookherjee,1984). Tournaments may also serve as an incentive 
mechanism for workers to acquire specific capital. The firm may attach relatively high wages to 
jobs which require relatively much specific capital, such that workers face a bonus if they 
develop the appropriate skills (Prendergast, 1993). 
While it is obvious that tournaments affect the wage curves of individual workers, it is 
difficult to predict what their precise implications are. As was argued at the beginning of this 
subsection, it is quite certain that promotions cause differences between wage and productivity. 
If a tournament consists of multiple rounds, say over n periods, then it may be optimal to keep 
the bonus constant at a relatively low level in the first n-1 rounds and at a relatively high level 
in the last round (Rosen, 1986). This offers an explanation for why promotions to top ranks in 
firms are associated with relatively large wage increases (see Baker et al., 1994a, for some 
empirical evidence). Second, it may also explain why older workers have on average relatively 
high wages.  
A drawback of tournaments compared to other payment schemes is that it can be equally 
rewarding for workers to sabotage the output of co-workers rather than to increase their own 
effort. Lazear (1989) demonstrates that the optimal bonus should be lower in that case. It is 
however questionable whether tournaments work if sabotage is a serious problem in the firm. A 
second drawback mentioned in the literature is that too large a wage dispersion within firms 
may be discouraging for employees. If workers perceive to be paid unfairly, they may start 
exerting less effort than they would otherwise (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990).    19 
2.3  Alternative theories 
Human capital investment and incentive contracts are not the only concepts that try to explain 
the relationship between life-cycle wage profiles and productivity profiles. In this section we 
review some alternative theories presented in the literature that can account for wage-
productivity gaps of individual workers. 
2.3.1  Collective bargaining 
Trade unions are traditionally associated with the standardization of pay-setting procedures, and 
incremental, seniority-based wage scales in particular. This raises the question why unions often 
adopt seniority scales.  
One strand of the literature on unions shows that unions’ distributional preferences – unions 
pay more attention to "senior" workers’ preferences – can explain various union practices, 
including rising seniority-wage profiles. For example, Weiss (1985) and Tracey (1986) explain 
the presence of rising seniority-wage profiles by assuming that "incumbents" (the older 
members of the union) control the union at the expense of newcomers. In such a setting, 
seniority wage increases are found to serve as implicit initiation fees and thus serve as one 
means of appropriating rents from future union members. Alternatively, union preferences may 
reflect the preferences of the representative worker, who simply prefers increasing wage 
profiles (as found by Loewenstein and Sicherman, 1991; see subsection 2.3.3).  
Another strand of the literature shows that seniority rules for employment and rising 
seniority-wage profiles are optimal for the union, even when it is indifferent to distribution 
(Frank, 1985; Kuhn, 1988; Kuhn and Robert, 1989, Frank and Malcomson, 1994). This is the 
so-called discriminating monopoly approach that employs a non-uniform pricing model of 
union wages. With a last-in, first-out (LIFO) layoff rule, the firm cannot easily replace high-
wage senior workers with low-wage junior workers. As a result, the marginal employment 
decision involves the low-wage junior workers. A new worker is taken on if the present 
discounted value of the lifetime marginal product exceeds the discounted lifetime income 
stream. Hiring a worker at the bottom of a steep scale is more profitable for the firm than at the 
constant average wage (or the wage that would prevail without a wage scale), since the firm 
pays the higher wage rates in the discounted future. In this way the union can extract (part of) 
the surplus from the firm, without distorting employment so much, as would be the case with a 
uniform wage. Thus, a seniority wage scale can achieve greater employment efficiency, and 
thereby increase the total surplus to be divided between the firm and the workers.
2 And, for 
given bargaining power, the union can achieve greater total income for the workers (Booth and 
Frank, 1996).  
 
2 If the union opts for greater employment efficiency with scales than in the case without scales, the present discounted 
value of a new worker actually decreases – as only then the firm employs more workers. The rationale for this behaviour is 
that the union maximizes total earnings over the working life, that is, without discounting. Or, in a static sense, it maximizes 
total earnings of its current members, if its members are equally distributed among seniority levels.   20 
In both situations, with distributional preferences or with discriminating monopoly, the process 
of collective bargaining between the firm and its workers, as represented by the trade union, 
induces a shift towards a steeper wage profile. This may result in a situation in which younger 
workers are paid less than their productivity and older workers more than their productivity. 
2.3.2  Insurance 
Risk averse agents derive utility from insurance against fluctuations in consumption. If financial 
markets cannot provide this insurance, then firms may provide it to their workers instead. For 
that purpose employers may offer employees a (relatively) stable wage profile. This can be 
efficient if the employer disposes of relevant information that an independent insurer does not 
(Malcomson, 1999). In addition, contracts that specify a stable wage profile shift risk from the 
employee to the employer. That is efficient if employers are less risk averse than employees or 
are better able to shift some of these risks to the capital market (Bovenberg and Teulings, 2008).  
In general, a contract that is not legally enforceable will only be adhered to if it is in the 
interest of both parties, that is, if it is self-enforcing. In such a setting both the firm and the 
employee are bounded by their outside option constraints, which define their alternative 
opportunities in the market. A self-enforcing contract consists of a sequence of wages (and 
possibly a sequence of hours) such that neither party prefers to take their outside option as long 
as it is efficient for employment to continue. The result is that the firm provides insurance to the 
employee in the form of a constant real wage until the wage is either too low to prevent the 
employee quitting (in which case it is increased by just enough to ensure the employee stays) or 
it is too high to prevent the firm laying off the employee (in which case it is reduced by just 
enough to avoid layoff). 
Contracts to insure employees’ earnings have a number of characteristics that are consistent 
with the empirical evidence (Malcomson, 1999). For example, such contracts are consistent 
with earnings fluctuating less than spot market earnings of employees with identical 
characteristics. In addition, employees hired at different dates under different labour market 
conditions also have different earnings. 
2.3.3  Worker preferences 
Many workers prefer increasing wage profiles over flat or decreasing wage profiles 
(Loewenstein and Sicherman, 1991; Frank and Hutchens, 1993; Neumark, 1995). Loewenstein 
and Sicherman (1991) offer four possible explanations for this finding. First, workers may 
associate wages with productivity and derive utility from a feeling of mastery when wages 
increase. Second, workers could anticipate a need for increased future expenditures but could 
experience difficulty controlling spending in early periods – a problem of self-control. Third, a 
preference for increasing wages (or payments) could be explained by a self-control problem 
combined with a utility function that depends positively on both changes in consumption and its 
absolute level. The fourth reason is that workers may derive utility in the present from   21 
anticipating future consumption, again combined with the problem of self-control. Notice that 
the first reason implies a direct preference for wage increases, whereas the other three reasons 
are based upon a preference for increasing consumption. The latter explanations therefore 
assume that workers have a self-control problem that prevents easy transformation of 
decreasing payments into an increasing consumption pattern.    22   23 
3  Empirical evidence 
We present an overview of the empirical literature testing the different theories discussed in the 
previous section. These tests are mostly indirect, as identification problems are the rule rather 
than the exception. An obvious problem is that individual productivity is never observed, so that 
e.g. the wage-productivity gap implied by Lazear style implicit contracts (LSICs) cannot be 
assessed directly. Moreover, it is not straightforward to estimate life-cycle profiles of both the 
individual’s wage and his productivity. The time span covered by longitudinal data sets is 
usually shorter than a life-cycle, so that profiles of different cohorts have to be compared in 
order to derive complete life-cycle profiles. Such comparison requires a correction for cohort 
effects, which can be hardly done without making some model assumptions. Another problem 
is endogenous selection. Workers who expect to earn low wages at old age are inclined to retire 
earlier than workers with a high earnings potential.
3 Similarly, firms wish to keep workers with 
high productivity, and stimulate lowly productive workers to retire. As a result, both the 
estimated wages and productivity of older workers are biased upward if the endogeneity is not 
properly taken into account. The recent development of matched employer-employee datasets 
has substantially increased possibilities for empirical research. Studies based on such data 
typically estimate production and wage equations for firms, and derive the impact of the firm’s 
age composition on both production and the firm’s wage bill. This approach can be used to test 
for LSICs and/or seniority wages in highly unionized sectors of industry. Studies making use of 
experiments have also become more popular lately. Such studies have been used to test 
tournament theory and the preferences of both employers and employees for non-decreasing 
wages. 
3.1  The empirical literature 
An individual’s productivity potential consists of his/her physical abilities, mental abilities, 
education, and job experience. Combined with the characteristics of the firm, these factors 
determine the individual’s job performance or productivity. Studies in occupational medicine, 
cognitive psychology, and gerontology find that physical and mental fitness are deteriorating 
from the age of 25 onwards. Fitness indicators used in these studies include muscle strength, 
sight, retentiveness, cognitive ability, and other measurable indicators (for an excellent survey, 
see Skirbekk, 2004). Different abilities tend to follow relatively independent paths over the life 
cycle. Some abilities, like the performance and speed of solving new tasks, are strongly reduced 
at older ages, while other abilities, like verbal capacities and word fluency, remain at a high 
 
3 The income effect, according to which high income individuals are inclined to retire earlier than low income individuals, 
works the other way (see, e.g., Johnson and Neumark, 1996). The problem of endogenous selection stays in place in case 
the income effect would dominate the substitution effect.   24 
functional level until late in life. Furthermore, training and experience can stabilize or even 
reverse age-specific declines in abilities.  
Ideally, the individual productivity level can be observed and compared with individual wages. 
Accurate measurement of individual output is however only possible for a small number of 
professions. Examples are the quantity and quality of publications in academic research, the 
output of artists (measured by number of paintings, albums, books), and performance in sports 
activities. For instance, Oster and Hamermesh (1984) find a declining age-productivity 
relationship for economists at 17 American top-universities. Fair (1998) finds that running 
times of athletes increase almost logarithmically between the ages of 35 and 75. The author is 
surprised about the “slow” rate of deterioration. For instance, a man aged 85 only needs about 
50% more time than a man aged 45 for running distances between 400 meters and a half 
marathon. Van Ours (2009) finds that running performance declines after age 40, but that the 
productivity of academic researchers remains quite constant at high age. 
In some occupations wages do reflect productivity. Lazear and Moore (1984) compare 
earnings profiles between self-employed and salary workers. They find that the self-employed 
tend to have little earnings variation over the life cycle, suggesting that the productivity profile 
is relatively flat. This contrasts the increasing wages of salary workers throughout their careers. 
Boot (1995) studies age-earnings profiles of British workers in physically demanding jobs 
during the first half of the 19th century. Men reach their peak earnings in their early 30s, and 
wages decrease substantially from around 40 years of age. As there were few regulations in the 
labour market at that time, the productivity profile likely resembles this wage profile.  
Such kind of studies are however rare. Most studies are not able to explicitly test for 
differences between wage and productivity level, simply because productivity cannot be 
observed. Some studies measure productivity for groups of workers or for firms as a whole. 
Typically, subjective assessments (Medoff and Abraham, 1980; 1981) or imperfect productivity 
indicators (Flabbi and Ichino, 2001) are used.  
Since the 1990s many studies have used matched employer-employee data sets, including 
Hellerstein and Neumark (1995, 2004), Hellerstein et al. (1999), Crepon et al. (2003), 
Ilmakunnas and Maliranta (2005), Dostie (2006), Lallemand and Rycx (2009), and van Ours 
and Stoeldraijer (2010). In these studies, the impact of the firm’s worker composition on 
production is estimated, and this gives correlations between the firm’s age composition and its 
production. The same is done for the firm’s wage bill. Most studies find an inverted U-shaped 
work performance profile. Workers in their 30s and 40s have the highest productivity levels, 
while workers above the age of 50 have lower productivity levels than their younger colleagues 
in spite of their higher wage level. A drawback of this approach is the relatively high level of 
aggregation. To address this issue, Börsch-Supan et al. (2006) estimate the relation between the 
age structure of work teams and their productivity for a car manufacturing plant, which is 
approximated by the number of errors made in the production process. They find an essentially 
flat age-productivity profile. Overall, the evidence from this literature is mixed. Most studies   25 
find that the firm’s average productivity does not increase as much as with age as wages do. A 
sizeable minority of studies however does not find proof for a wage-productivity gap of older 
workers. 
Table 3.1  Testable implications of different theories 
Testable implication  Main finding literature 
   
Incentive theory (LSIC)   
The life-cycle wage profile is steeper than the life-cycle productivity profile.   (+) 
Self-employed workers have less steep wage profiles than employees.   + 
The difference between pay and productivity is highest in those functions where it is 
difficult to observe/verify worker productivity.  
 
+ 
Pensions and/or mandatory retirement are most common for those functions where it is 
difficult to observe/verify worker productivity. 
 
lack of results 
Mandatory retirement is related to pension provision by the firm.  lack of results 
Firms are less inclined to hire older workers.  ++ 
An unexpected takeover of the firm reduces employment of older workers.  + 




Individual wages rise less with tenure, the more they are based on individual output.  + 
   
Tournament theory   
Promotions bring about discrete wage jumps.  + 
Workers’ incentives to perform result from wage differentials (not levels) between 
different ranks within the firm. 
+ 
The set of promotions or bonuses is fixed beforehand.  + 
Positive relation between firm productivity and within-firm wage dispersion.  + 
   
Theory on general human capital   
More general human capital leads to higher wages  ++ 
Individual wage differentials reflect productivity differentials.  (-) 
Wages rise with total job market experience, but not with tenure  (-) 
   
Theory on specific human capital   
Wages rise with firm tenure.  + 
The individual wage profile is less steep than the productivity profile.  -- 
Firms provide incentives to keep workers attached, such as backloaded compensation 
and generous pensions. 
 
lack of results 
Firms are less inclined to hire older workers.  ++ 
   
Theory on collective wage bargaining   
Returns to tenure larger in unionized sectors  + 
Displaced workers in unionized sectors experience relatively large wage losses  (+) 
 
A ‘(+)’ indicates that although the literature does not provide unambiguous results, a majority of studies is in accordance with the testable 
implication; a ‘+’ indicates that the literature is largely consistent with the testable implication; and a ‘++’ indicates that the effect is well-
established in the literature. The number of empirical studies is taken into account when scoring the testable implication. Similar notations 
are used for negative outcomes, with ‘(-)’, ‘-’ and ‘--’. 
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In most studies, it is not possible to determine the precise cause of divergence between wages 
and productivity. The sign of a divergence may obviously rule out the relevance of some 
theories, but it is typical that no strong conclusions can be drawn on the prevalence of e.g. 
incentive theory because other theories may lead to similar shapes of wage and productivity 
profiles.  
In total, we have found about 70 empirical papers focusing on the discussed theories (see the 
appendix). About half of the studies focuses on the US, more than a third on European 
countries, and the rest on other countries (Australia, Canada, Ghana, Israel, and Japan). 
Empirical studies typically test one or more implications of a theory. Table 2 offers a list of the 
implications that have been tested most often in the empirical literature. Although there is still 
discussion about some of the testable implications, and some have not yet been studied well 
enough, the literature has already established some important results. Two of the most 
convincing findings are that firms are reluctant to hire older workers, and that the wage profile 
of workers is not less steep than the productivity profile. In the following subsection we 
formulate more general conclusions on the basis of these findings in the literature. 
3.2  Main implications 
The theory of general human capital does mostly not suffice to explain observed wage profiles. 
This result was established empirically by Medoff and Abraham (1980, 1981) on the basis of 
personnel data from large U.S. manufacturing firms. The authors use job performance ratings 
done by immediate supervisors to measure the relative productivity of managerial and 
professional employees engaged in comparable work. They find no association (or even a 
negative one) between experience and relative performance, and a strong positive association 
between experience and relative earnings. Flabbi and Ichino (2001) confirmed Medoff and 
Abraham’s conclusion on a sample of non-managerial employees of a large Italian bank, 
extending the analysis by considering alternative measures of productivity. Other studies 
confirming that wages do not necessarily reflect productivity are Bishop (1987) and Kotlikoff 
and Gokhale (1992). 
Of course, general human capital still remains an important factor. Many empirical studies 
do find a positive effect of general labour market experience on individual wages, which is an 
important indication for the relevance of general human capital. Results from three important 
studies even imply that most wage variation can be attributed to differences in general human 
capital (Altonji and Shakotko, 1987; Abraham and Farber, 1987; Hellerstein et al., 1999). 
Although Altonji and Shakotko (1987) do find a small positive tenure effect on individual 
wages, their main conclusion is that “general labor market experience accounts for the lion’s 
share of wage growth during a career”. In addition, Yamaguchi (2007) finds that the wage 
growth of American higher educated workers (college graduates) is primarily driven by general 
skills, and that firm-specific human capital does not play an important role for this category.   27 
The reverse is found for high school graduates. However, Beffy et al. (2006) establish precisely 
the opposite result for French data. 
Practically all studies which have been published during the 1990s and 2000s – typically 
using better data and/or better estimation techniques than the early studies by Altonji and 
Shakotko (1987) and Abraham and Farber (1987) – agree that individual wages are 
simultaneously driven by other factors than general human capital.
4 Thus, at present there does 
not seem to be much controversy over our first conclusion: besides the theory of general human 
capital, at least one other theory is relevant in explaining individual wage profiles.  
 
Tenure with the firm affects the wage rate, but there is controversy over the magnitude of this 
effect. A large body of empirical research has focused on obtaining estimates for the returns to 
experience (time spent in the labour market) and tenure (time spent in the firm). It is often 
thought that the return to labour market experience is closely related to the return to general 
human capital, and the return to tenure is closely related to specific human capital. As was 
mentioned in the previous conclusion, some authors – in particular Altonji and Shakotko (1987) 
and Altonji and Williams (1997) – believe that the returns to firm tenure are only modest. On 
the contrary, a number of other studies, such as Topel (1991), find a strong positive relationship 
between wages and tenure.  
Using longitudinal matched employer-employee data for France, Abowd et al. (2006) find 
that the average structural returns to tenure are close to zero. However, this masks an enormous 
amount of heterogeneity in firm compensation, promotion and retention policies adopted by 
firms. The main contrast is between high-wage, low-mobility firms where returns to tenure are 
low (even negative) and low-wage, high-mobility firms where returns to tenure are relatively 
high. Beffy et al. (2006) also find different results for subgroups, ranging from no returns to 
tenure for high school drop-outs to very high returns to tenure for college graduates. The 
authors also find higher tenure effects for the US than for France. The rationale is that US firms 
aim to reduce their relatively mobile workers, while French firms do not need to reward tenure 
in order to keep their (relatively immobile) workers at the firm.  
It should be noted that tenure effects do not necessarily imply that specific human capital is 
relevant. Other theories, such as Lazear’s agency theory do also imply that individual wages 
rise with firm tenure. For instance, Abowd et al. (1999) find that their (positive) returns to 
tenure are negatively correlated with firm-specific intercepts in the compensation relation, 
which is consistent with Lazear’s theory rather than the theory of specific capital. One should 
thus take care not to confuse a significant tenure effect with ‘proof’ of the relevance of specific 
human capital. 
 
The accumulation of firm-specific capital is important in some firms and at certain education 
levels. Firm-specific capital is never directly observed, and is not necessarily a part of the 
 
4 This includes the studies by Altonji and Williams (1997) and Hellerstein and Neumark (2004).   28 
workers’ wages. This severely hampers the task of testing the specific capital model. In 
addition, while the specific-capital model is able to explain a core set of facts about worker 
mobility, it also appears that worker heterogeneity can account for much of what we observe in 
the mobility data. These results and considerations induce Farber (1999) to conclude that, while 
deriving convincing direct evidence for the specific capital model is difficult, it appears that 
specific capital is a useful construct for understanding wage dynamics and worker mobility. In 
addition, Malcomson (1999) concludes that “models of hold-up look promising candidates for 
providing rigorous theoretical foundations for at least some of the observed behaviour of wages. 
These models are, however, too new for the empirical studies drawn on in the discussion to 
have been designed with them in mind and so those empirical studies have not tested their 
predictions at all rigorously.” Almost a decade ahead since Malcomson’s conclusion, it still 
looks early to draw a final conclusion on the precise relevance of specific human capital and its 
impact on individual wages. 
This is not too say however that empirical research has halted since, on the contrary. 
Recently, a number of studies have made use of the large administrative French panel data set 
‘DADS’, and linked these individual employee records to employer data. On the basis of these 
data, Beffy et al. (2006) interpret their significant tenure effects as an indication for the 
relevance of firm-specific capital. In addition, the authors find much heterogeneity among 
different educational categories.
5 They find that in particular university graduates have very 
high returns to tenure. On the other hand, only small tenure effects are found for high school 
drop-outs. Thus, following the authors’ reasoning, there is substantial heterogeneity among 
educational categories concerning the relevance of specific human capital. Using the same data 
set, Dostie (2005) however concludes that “[f]irm-specific capital does not seem to be 
important, and human capital would be easily transferable from firm to firm.” He bases this 
conclusion on the finding that the average tenure effect can entirely be related to selection on 
the basis of unobserved characteristics of both workers and firms. The author does however not 
allow for heterogeneous tenure effects for different levels of education. 
Similar to Beffy et al. (2006), Dustmann and Meghir (2005) also find substantial 
heterogeneity among different educational groups in Germany, but reach an opposite 
conclusion, viz. that firm-specific human capital is more relevant for unskilled workers 
(including high school drop-outs) than for skilled workers. Similar results are found for the US. 
In a recent study, Buchinsky et al. (2005) find large returns to tenure for all education groups. 
They find that the cumulative return to tenure is relatively high for the least educated, which 
leads the authors to conclude that a larger share of their human capital is firm-specific. Using 
 
5 In an earlier study based on the same data set, Abowd et al. (1999) also find substantial heterogeneity in the returns to 
tenure, although not necessarily related to education.   29 
another data set, Yamaguchi (2007) also finds significant returns to tenure for lower educated 
workers, but none for college graduates.  
There also appears to be considerable variation in the return to tenure across firms (Abowd 
et al., 1999; 2006).This suggests that firm-specific human capital may be relevant in some firms 
and irrelevant in others. 
Many authors seem to agree that the relation between tenure effects and specific capital is 
more relevant in the US than in France – or continental Europe in general – as American 
workers are more mobile, and thus need to be stimulated to stay with the firm for a longer 
period in order to generate returns to specific capital investments made by the employer 
(Buchinsky et al., 2005; Beffy et al., 2006).   
 
A majority of papers supports the relevance of Lazear style implicit contracts. For countries 
other than the US, results in 18 out of 21 studies are consistent with implications from the 
theory of Lazear style implicit contracts (LSICs). For the US this holds in 8 out of 15 studies. 
Thus, there appears to be more controversy in the US than in other countries over the 
prevalence of LSICs. From a theoretical point of view this can be considered quite remarkable, 
as Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) in the US is generally less strict than in European 
countries. It was seen in the previous section that the threat of dismissal is an essential element 
in LSICs: deferred compensation can only function as an incentive for the individual worker if 
he runs the risk of missing out on it in case he is detected shirking. Theory thus predicts that 
LSICs are likely to be less relevant in countries with strict EPL. 
It is virtually impossible to test Lazear’s theory directly. As was expounded in the previous 
section, deferred compensation schemes can only be optimal in cases where worker effort is not 
verifiable by third parties. This means that researchers also have a hard time observing worker 
effort and productivity. In fact, the more precise the data on individual worker effort or 
productivity, the less likely it is that Lazear style implicit contracts (LSICs) play a role. 
Therefore, most papers rely on indirect evidence. In particular, many studies have tested 
whether individual wage profiles are steeper than productivity profiles (a.o. Lazear and Moore, 
1984; Hutchens, 1987; Abowd et al., 1999; Lazear, 2000). Other authors have focused on the 
issue of mandatory retirement (Lazear, 1979; Clark and Ogawa, 1992). Both papers examine 
whether an early mandatory retirement age is associated with a steep earnings profile (and vice 
versa), and indeed find that this is the case. This is in accordance with Lazear’s theory.  
Some of the best-known studies producing favourable results for LSICs are Lazear and 
Moore (1984), Hutchens (1987), Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1992), and Hellerstein and Neumark 
(2004) for the US; Crepon et al. (2003) for France; and Dostie (2006) for Canada. In addition, 
Huck et al. (2004) provide some experimental evidence on the link between deferred 
compensation schemes and worker effort by performing tests on a sample of 60 British 
university students. They propose a three-period compensation scheme based on the Lazear   30 
model, and find that this scheme indeed stimulates life-time worker effort in 70 percent of 
cases. 
Some of the more critical studies – both on data from the US – are Brown (1989), who finds 
that virtually all within-firm wage growth can be attributed to productivity growth, and 
Hellerstein et al. (1999), who find that interpersonal wage differentials do generally reflect 
productivity differentials. 
 
The observed wage profiles of individual workers cannot be fully explained by either deferred 
compensation or specific human capital theory. The relevance of the different theories clearly 
depends on the setting. LSICs are more likely to be relevant in jobs where worker output is 
difficult to verify, and the accumulation of specific capital is obviously more relevant in jobs 
which require specific skills. On the other hand, several authors have shown that even within a 
given firm multiple theories are needed in order to understand the observed individual wages. 
According to Baker et al. (1994b), wage changes cannot be entirely explained by either 
incentive theory, on-the-job-training (specific capital), or firm learning about the employee’s 
innate ability. Seltzer and Merrett (2000) find that both incentive theory and the theory of 
specific human capital are the cause of tenure effects in individual wages. We therefore 
postulate that it is the rule rather than the exception that the wage formation of individual 
workers involves at least two different theories. 
The accumulation of specific human capital may be most relevant for younger workers, and 
LSICs may be most relevant for older workers. This proposition is confirmed in the case studies 
by Seltzer and Merrett (2000), who use a long panel data set of white collar workers at an 
Australian bank, and Shaw and Lazear (2007), who use a panel of workers in an American 
windshield installation firm. In addition to these studies, many other findings are implicitly 
consistent with this complementary role for specific human capital and incentive theories. For 
instance, in studying the growth of wages of young workers (up to the age of 35) in Germany, 
Dustmann and Meghir (2005) find that returns to (firm) tenure during the initial five-year period 
at the firm equal 4% per year for unskilled workers and 2% for skilled workers. However, no 
additional returns to tenure are found after these five years. 
 
Tournament theory is relevant. Of those empirical studies focusing on the relevance of 
tournament theory, not one single study was able to reject any implication by this theory. The 
influential studies by Baker et al. (1994a; 1994b) conclude that none of the major theories alone 
can explain the wage policy of a certain medium sized US firm in the service industry. In the 
second place, many of the firm’s wage policies turn out to be consistent with tournament 
theory. Amongst others, the authors find that promotions bring discrete salary premiums, and 
that these are especially high for the highest job levels; and that the firm a priori determines a 
set of rewards that the workers have to compete for. It should however be mentioned that most 
empirical evidence is derived from US data from the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, this research   31 
typically focuses on the wage policy of one single firm, which of course needs not be 
representative for other firms. It is very likely that tournament theory is more relevant in one 
firm than in the other, in particular it should be relevant in those firms where the relative 
productivity of individual workers can be observed (and not the absolute productivity level). 
Experimental evidence shows that bonuses outperform piece-rate schemes in case productivity 
is multi-dimensional (Fehr and Schmidt, 2004), and that effort increases with the prize spread 
(Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2003). An early experimental study by Bull et al. (1987) concludes 
that although results are on average supportive of tournament theory, there is much 
heterogeneity in individual behaviour. Additional experimental evidence concludes that 
tournaments may attract specific types of workers, in particular over-confident, selfish, and less 
risk averse workers compared to other payment schemes (Dohmen and Falk, 2006). Firms may 
either stimulate or curb such self-selection through their tournament design. 
 
Wages rise more with seniority in unionized sectors. In a study of British panel data, Booth and 
Frank (1996) find that, for unions with seniority scales, the union wage differential is increasing 
with seniority. This is not the case for unions without seniority scales. Using an extended 
British panel data set, Zangelidis (2008) reports that seniority-earnings profiles appear to be 
steeper in the union sector, while occupational expertise (as opposed to mere tenure) is 
estimated to have a more significant role in non-union jobs. The results in Abraham and Farber 
(1988), Kuhn and Sweetman (1999), Ballou and Podgursky (2002), and Williams (2009) also 
support this conclusion. 
 
Workers prefer stable wages, and this may lead to a wage-productivity gap at old age. Many 
workers derive positive utility from receiving an increasing sequence of payments, and negative 
utility from a decline in payments. This preference appears to be independent of the 
consumption levels that could be attained through this stream of income (Loewenstein and 
Sicherman, 1991). According to managers, one of the main reasons for avoiding pay cuts is 
morale damage. In Kaufman (1984), firms were asked if they could find qualified personnel at 
less than current wages, and if so, what prevents the firm from cutting wages. The most 
common response to the last question was that wage reductions would upset workers and reduce 
their work effort. According to Bewley (1999), wage cuts affect worker morale, whereas wage 
increases do not. The reason for this dissimilarity is that workers quickly get used to increases, 
and grow to believe they have a right to them. The past wage is used as a reference wage from 
which the ‘fairness’ of the current wage is inferred. Many studies indeed find that workers’ 
concerns about fairness and relative wages partly explain why firms prefer not to cut wages 
during recessions. For instance, the experimental evidence in Fehr and Falk (1999) shows that 
employers refuse to offer low wages to their workers. A lower wage would damage work effort. 
Blinder and Choi (1990) report that 53% of the personnel managers found the idea of an 
implicit insurance through stable wages ‘somewhat plausible’ or ‘relevant’.     32   33 
4  Conclusion 
This paper reviews theory and empirical evidence on the discrepancies between wage and 
productivity profiles, with a focus on older workers. One major conclusion is that considerable 
heterogeneity among firms and workers renders it impossible to derive general conclusions on 
the appropriate theory to explain such discrepancies. Indeed, the relevance of theories may 
differ across countries, sectors, firms and individuals and may depend on various factors, such 
as education, mobility, age, and the institutional environment. Despite these differences, we 
draw some lessons from the literature. 
Theories emphasizing specific human capital are able to explain why firms employ older 
workers but hardly ever hire them. The evidence grants support to this theory and it seems 
particularly important at the early stages of careers. However, its precise relevance is still 
subject to debate. In the empirical literature, there are strong indications that this theory alone 
cannot explain the wage patterns of older workers, and that at least one other theory should be 
added to allow for proper explanations of wage profiles. For instance, studies allowing for both 
specific human capital and deferred payment schemes gain some support. Moreover, theories 
that emphasize insurance, collective bargaining, and workers' preferences also receive some 
support from the data. Hence, it is unlikely that just one theory explains the wage-productivity 
gap for all older workers.  
Different theories arrive at different outcomes regarding the optimality of wage profiles. In 
some theories, a wage-productivity gap is socially desirable, especially when firms and workers 
find it optimal to conclude such a payment scheme without imposing external costs on others. 
In principle, this is the case in, for instance, Lazear style implicit contracts, worker preferences 
theory, and insurance theories. However, deferred compensation schemes may be inefficient if 
they aggravate problems of liquidity constrained young households or discourage job-to-job 
mobility at old age. Moreover, wage bargaining theories emphasize inefficiencies of wage 
contracts due to monopsony power of trade unions. As a result, the normative implications of 
the different theories may differ importantly.  
In the coming years, we will see how various trends will affect wage profiles for elderly 
workers. For instance, an ageing population may induce pressure on too large discrepancies that 
involve an implicit transfer between generations. Moreover, technological shocks or dynamic 
adjustment due to globalization can make it more costly to have large discrepancies between 
wage and productivity at old age.   
The empirical literature has quickly grown in size recently, but there still remain some 
important questions. First, there is still some controversy over the precise shape of the life-cycle 
wage profiles of individual workers. Most data sets are simply too short to cover an entire life-
cycle, and therefore most studies have had to make identifying assumptions on cohort effects in 
order to determine the wage profile of an individual worker. It will become possible in the near 
future to estimate more precise life-cycle wage profiles as longer data sets become available. A   34 
second line of future research could link employer-employee matched data sets to subjective 
employer assessments as a proxy for individual productivity. Current studies often link 
workers’ wages to average firm productivity, which is in fact quite a crude way to assess wage-
productivity gaps for workers within specific age groups. A more disaggregated approach partly 
based on subjective data could yield more precise knowledge, and would in any case learn 
something on deviations between wages and the employer’s perceived productivity. Finally, 
some more research is needed on the complementarities of different theories. Much empirical 
research still shows a tendency to focus on one particular theory, whereas the interplay between 
the different theories appears quite important. For instance, deferred compensation schemes 
may be less attractive for the employer if employment protection of older workers is relatively 
strong. Once we know more on such interactions, the relative importance of the different 
theories discussed in this article will be better understood.   35 
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Appendix A  Overview of empirical studies 
No.  Study  Country  Data 
       
1  Tsuru (2007)  Jap  large Japanese auto sale firm, 1995-2004, reform in 2000 
       
       
2  Fukao et al. (2006)  Jap  panel of 36,905 manufacturing firms with matched workers,  
      1993-2003, Census of Manufacture (CM) and BSWS 
3  Tanaka (2001)  Jap  repeated cross-section of male employees from all sectors,  
      1980-1994 (BSWS) 
4  Ohkusa (1997)  Jap  cross-section of 30,413 employees and 4679 self-employed  
      workers, 1992 (BSES) 
       
5  Clark and Ogawa (1992)  Jap  repeated cross-section of about 6,000 firms, with matched male  
      workers, 1981 and 1986 (Survey on Employment Management 
      and BSWS) 
6  Hashimoto and Raisian (1985)  US and  cross-section of male workers in nonagricultural private industries,  
    Jap  cell means for Japan, 1980 (BSWS), individual observations for 
      US, 1979 (CPS) 
7  Levine (1993b)  US and  cross-section of 3,529 male workers from 80 manufacturing plants,  
    Jap  1982-1983 
       
       
8  Shaw and Lazear (2007)  US  panel of 3,707 workers in 1 firm (windshield installation),  
      1994-1995 
       
9  Yamaguchi (2007)  US  panel of white males aged 17-35, 593 high school graduates, and   
      478 college graduates, 1979-2004 (NLSY79) 
       
10  Montizaan et al. (2007)  US  panel of 4,549 men, 1966-1983 (NLSOM) 
       
11  Buchinsky et al. (2005)  US  panel of about 4,000 heads of households, aged 18-65, 1975-1992  
      (PSID) 
       
12 
 




cross-section of 20,056 manufacturing plants, and 522,802 
matched workers, 1990 (DEED)               
       
13  Balan (2003)  US  panel of male heads of households, full-time non-union workers 
      employed in private sector firms, aged 25-54, 1981-1992 (PSID) 
       
14  Hu (2003)  US  repeated cross-section of 11,113 workers aged 20-65, 1979-1993  
      (CPS) 
15  Grant (2003)  US  panel of 23,132 private sector workers, 1966-1998 (NLS) 
       
       
16  Kawaguchi (2003)  US  panel of 2,715 white men, 1985-1998 (NLSY79) 
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Appendix A  Overview of empirical studies (continued) 
No.     Main finding(s)  Rationale or implication 
       
1    shift from a tenure-oriented payment scheme towards  the incentive effect of a performance oriented 
     a performance-oriented scheme brought a slight  scheme is more important than human capital 
     improvement in individual productivity  theories 
2    the wage-tenure profile is steeper than the   consistent with (implicit) incentive theory 
     productivity-tenure profile   
3    positive tenure effect on wages; effect is however   investments in specific human capital 
     becoming less important in later years   
4    productivity profiles are less steep for self-employed  LSIC rejected; accumulation of firm-specific human  
     than for employed workers; but no difference for small  capital seems to be important 
     firms   
5    an increase in the age of mandatory retirement  incentive theory is more relevant than human capital 
     reduces the rate of growth of earnings with job tenure  theory 
       
6    both earnings-tenure and earnings-experience profiles  consistent with (a.o.) the theory of specific human  
     are more steeply sloped in Japan than in the US  capital and incentive theory; not clear which theory  
       is more important 
7    plants with high returns to tenure do not provide   at odds with human capital theory 
     above-average levels of training, and do not face    
     lower turnover; high levels of on-the-job training do not   
     imply lower turnover   
8    during two initial years on the job, the pay profile is  evidence supports both firm-specific investments 
     flatter than the output profile; wages rise faster than   (when young) and incentive pay (when older) 
     productivity as workers get older   
9    returns to tenure very low for college graduates, and  specific human capital seems to be relevant for high 
     relatively high for high school graduates; significant  school graduates, not for college graduates 
     returns to general experience   
10    workers with firm-specific training retire at an earlier  indication that firms using much specific capital bond  
     age than workers with a general training background  their workers by offering deferred compensation 
11    returns to tenure are even larger than in Topel (1991);  specific human capital is an important factor  
     returns to experience are much higher for college   
     graduates than for lower levels of education   
12    wage and productivity profiles are rising and concave;  consistent with (implicit) incentive theory 
     estimated relative wage profile is steeper than relative   
     productivity profile   
13   
    
some evidence that the formation of LSIC's between  
firms and new entrants into the labour market has 
declined (or ceased) 
the costs associated with LSIC's have increased  
(which is related to the ban on mandatory 
retirement), while benefits have decreased 
14    sizeable tenure effects, ranging from 20 to 40% per 20  specific capital seems to be important 
     years, for small and large firms, respectively   
15    both the contemporaneous unemployment rate and  partial wage insurance against negative labour  
     the lowest unemployment rate since being hired affect   demand shocks, partial wage responsiveness to  
     wages  current labour market conditions 
16    self-employed wages are closer to productivity levels;  in accordance with findings of Lazear (1984),  
     they have a higher level of initial human capital, and  but lower human capital investments by self- 
     invest less in human capital   employed explain results (rather than LSIC) 
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Appendix A  Overview of empirical studies (continued) 
       
No.  Study  Country  Data 
       
17  von Wachter (2002)  US  cross-sections of male employees aged 55-75, 1968-2000 (CPS),  
      data on mandatory retirement imputed from RHS and NLS 
18  Stern and Todd (2000)  US  panel of 2,497 men, 1966-1983 (NLS) 
       
       
19  Hellerstein et al. (1999b)  US  cross-section of 3,102 plants (WECD), and 128,460 matched  
      workers (LRD) 
20  Parent (1999)  US  panel of 5,649 young workers, 1979-91 (NLSY) 
       
       
       
       
21  Loewenstein, Spletzer (1999)  US  panel of 4,814 individuals, 1993-1994 (NLSY) and a survey of 
      1,527 employers, 1982 (EOPP), data are not matched 
22  Altonji and Williams (1997)  US  panel containing about 10,000 observations (depending on sample  
      selection), 1968-1991 (PSID) 
23  Johnson and Neumark (1996)  US  panel of 2,767 male employees aged 45 and over, 1966-1983  
      (NLSOM) 
       
24  Gokhale et al. (1995)  US  panel of 133 employers, 1980-1991 (Community Salary Survey) 
       
       
25  Knoeber and Thurman (1994)  US  panel of 75 broiler chicken growers, 1981-1985 
       
26  Baker et al. (1994a)  US  panel of over 5,000 employees in amedium-sized firm in a service  
      industry, 1969-1988 
       
       
27  Baker et al. (1994b)  US  panel of over 5,000 employees in amedium-sized firm in a service  
      industry, 1969-1988 
       
28  Kaestner and Solnick (1992)  US  cross-section of 13,566 white maile employees from a large  
      manufacturing company, 1980-1983 
       
29  Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1992)  US  panel of 5,598 workers in one (anonymous) large firm, 1969-1983  
       
       
       
30  Topel (1991)  US  panel of 1,540 white male employees, aged 18-60, 1968-1983  
      (PSID) 
31  Brown (1989)  US  panel of 995 heads of households, 1976-1984 (PSID)  
       
       
32  Abraham and Farber (1987)  US  panel of 1,537 male heads of households with non-union jobs,  
      aged 18-60, 1968-1981 (PSID) 
       
33  Altonji and Shakotko (1987)  US  panel of 2,163 white male heads of households, aged 18-60,  
      1968-1980 (PSID) 
         47 
Appendix A  Overview of empirical studies (continued) 
     
No.  Main finding(s)  Rationale or implication 
     
17  mandatory retirement does not affect wage profiles,   seems at odds with Lazear's theory on implicit 
    it also does not affect job tenure  contracts and mandatory retirement 
18  positive correlation between mandatory retirement and   the second finding is not consistent with Lazear's  
   pension provision; however, employees retire earlier   theory on mandatory retirement 
   under a mandatory retirement scheme   
19  wage differentials between different types of workers   not in accordance with LSIC; consistent with the 
   generally reflect productivity differentials  general human capital model 
20  substantial returns to on-the-job training; general   consistent with human capital theory; may seem  
   training is fully reflected in higher wages; however,  surprising that workers do not capture any of the 
   returns on specific investments are fully captured by  returns on firm-specific capital 
   the firm; workers do not appear to bear the costs of   
   general investments through lower (initial) wages   
21  most employer-provided training is general; employers  role of specific human capital seems to be limited 
   often extract some of the returns to general training   
22  returns to tenure are modest, around 1% per year  modest role for specific capital accumulation 
      
23  some wage decline is found for workers aged 63 and  seems inconsistent with general human capital 
   above, but this appears to be largely related to the  theory; alternative theories seem to play a role 
   Social Security system   
24  hostile takeovers reduce the relative employment of older  consistent with (implicit) incentive theory 
   workers, and reduce the steepness of wage-seniority    
   profiles   
25  growers respond to prize differentials, not prize levels;  consistent with tournament theory 
   less able growers adopt riskier behaviour   
26  promotions bring discrete salary premiums; these   consistent with tournament theory 
   premiums are especially high for the highest job levels;    
   in explaining wage variance, job levels have much more    
   explanatory power than human capital variables    
27  the firm deteremins a set of nominal rewards that  consistent with tournament theory 
   employees have to compete for; individual rewards are   
   based on recent (not past) performance   
28  promotions have as much impact on wage growth as  consistent with incentive theory; inconsistent with  
   seniority; returns to seniority increase with firm position  human capital theory 
   (rank); however, relative returns do not increase   
29  productivity falls with age; compensation first lies below  consistent with incentive theory 
   and then exceeds productivity; discrepancy between    
   compensation and productivity is highest for functions   
   where it is difficult to observe productivity   
30  returns to tenure are substantial, 10 years of job seniority  specific human capital is an important factor  
   raises the wage by more than 25 percent   
31  firm-specific wage growth occurs almost  within-firm wage growth is mainly determined by  
   exclusively during periods of on-the-job training  productivity growth, no evidence that (implicit)  
     contractual considerations imply wage growth 
32  small return to seniority, about 0.25% (blue collar jobs)   the role of incentive theory seems to be limited;  
   or 0.5% (white collar jobs) per year; positive correlation  results are consistent with efficiency wage models 
   between job duration and earnings   
33  wages increase with total job market experience, but   general human capital accumulation is important 
   are only weakly positively related to tenure on the   determinant of wage growth; specific capital does 
   current job  not seem to be important   48 
Appendix A  Overview of empirical studies (continued) 
       
No.  Study  Country  Data 
       
34  Hutchens (1987b)  US  cross-section of 2,852 older men, 1971 (NLS and DOT) 
       
       
35  Rumberger (1987)  US  survey of ~1,500 workers (1969 Survey of Working Conditions; 
      1973 and 1977 Quality of Employment Surveys) 
36  Murphy (1986)  US  panel of 1,488 CEO's in 992 firms, 1974-1985 (Forbes 
      magazine) 
       
       
37  Lazear and Moore (1984)  US  cross-section of 11,987 male nongovernment workers, of  
      which 15% self-employed, 1977 (CPS) 
       
38  Leigh (1984)  US  panel of men aged 45 and older, 1966-1981 (NLS) 
       
       
39  Medoff and Abraham (1980)  US  panel of 7,606 full-time employed, white, male, managerial and  
      professional employees at two large manufacturing companies, 
      1971-1977 
       
40  Medoff and Abraham (1981)  US  panel of 7,547 full-time employed, white, male, managerial and 
      professional employees at a large manufacturing corporation,  
      1972-1977 
41  Bull et al (1987)  US  experiments using 24 students (economics) per treatment 
       
       
42  Abraham and Farber (1988)  US  panel of 1,382 male heads of households, unionized and  
      non-unionized, aged 18-60, 1968-1980 (PSID) 
43  Ballou and Podgursky (2002)  US  panel of 502,000 teachers, 1986-1998 (DOD) 
44  Kuhn and Sweetman (1999)  US  4 samples (USDWS, CDWS, COEP, OML) of men, aged 20-64,  
      not self-employed, in different years (resp. 1994 and 1996, 1986,  
      1993, 1982) 
45  Dustmann and Meghir (2005)  Ger  panel of 32,913 young male workers (age 15-35), German Social  
      Security Records, 1975-1995 (IAB) 
       
       
       
46  Harbring and Irlenbusch (2003)  Ger  experiments using 36 students (different disciplines) per treatment 
       
47  Dohmen and Falk (2006)  Ger  experiments, total of 240 students 
       
       
48  Williams (2009)  UK  panel of male employees aged 18-60, 1991-2001 (BHPS) 
       
       
49  Sessions and Theodoropoulos  UK  repeated cross-section of 30,848 British workplaces, 1998 and  
  (2008)    2004 (WERS) 
50  Daniel and Heywood (2007)  UK  survey of 900+ British workplaces with at least 10 employees, 
      and matched employee data, 1998 (WERS) 
         49 
Appendix A  Overview of empirical studies (continued) 
     
No  Main finding(s)  Rationale or implication 
     
34  jobs with repetitive tasks (easy to monitor) have relatively   consistent with Lazear style implicit contracts 
   low wages, short job tenures, lack of pensions, and less    
   mandatory retirement   
35  schooling in excess of that required in the job is  human capital is not fully reflected in wages 
   rewarded at a lower rate than required schooling   
36  upward sloping experience-earnings profiles are   the last two findings are inconsistent with incentive  
   found; relation between pay and performance is   theory; the authors favour theory that ceo abiliity is 
  strongest during initial years as CEO and during early   initially unknown, but revealed over time 
  years with the firm   
37  wage growth for hired workers exceeds that for  incentive theory can explain the steeper profile,  
  self-employed workers  under the assumption that human capital  
    accumulation is equal for both categories 
38  both specific training and vested pension benefits are  the prevalence of mandatory retirement can for a   
  directly related to mandatory retirement; unionisation  large part be explained by the theory of specific  
  has also a strong impact on mandatory retirement  human capital (in addition to incentive theory) 
39  there is a strong positive association between relative   results are at odds with human capital interpretation  
   earnings and experience, and no association or even a   of experience-earnings profile 
   negative association between experience and relative    
   performance   
40  the earnings rise with experience cannot be explained by  results are at odds with human capital interpretation  
   higher productivity; the relative performance of more  of experience-earnings profile 
   experienced workers even deteriorates   
41  theory explains average behavior in tournaments    evidence supports tournament theory 
   reasonably well; however there is a large variance of    
    behavior across identical tournaments   
42  the return to seniority in the union sector is larger than   evidence supports collective bargaining theory 
   in the nonunion sector   
43  unions raise the returns to tenure  evidence supports collective bargaining theory 
44  unionized workers experience much greater wage losses  evidence supports collective bargaining theory 
   than other displaced workers   
     
45  wages of skilled workers grow with experience, in   specific human capital theory is relatively more  
   particular during the first three years; modest return to  important for unskilled workers; skilled workers' human 
   tenure during the first 5 years; wages of  unskilled workers  capital is largely transferable 
   grow with experience during the first two years, and    
   returns to firm tenure during the first 5 years are large   
46  effort increases with the prize spread; variability of   evidence supports tournament theory 
   behavior decreases with the number of winner prizes   
47  output is much higher in the variable pay schemes (piece   evidence supports incentive theories  
   rate, tournament) compared to the fixed payment scheme;   
  this difference is largely driven by productivity sorting   
48  tenure plays a modest role; heterogeneity is very  evidence supports collective bargaining theory;  
   important; tenure effect seems to be related to union   specific human capital seems to be of minor  
   coverage  importance 
49  increased worker monitoring is negatively related to the   incentive theory drives the wage-tenure profile rather 
   slope of the wage-tenure profile  than human capital considerations 
50  firms which defer compensation are less inclined to  robust evidence in favour of strategic compensation  
   hire older workers; firms requiring specialised training  back-loading; weak evidence for the role of training 
   are somewhat less inclined to hire older workers     50 
Appendix A  Overview of empirical studies (continued) 
       
No.  Study  Country  Data 
       
51  Devereux and Hart (2007)  UK  panel of about 180,000 full-time workers (NESPD) 
       
52  Beffy et al. (2006)  Fra  panel of 86,651 employees, 1976-1995 (EDP/DADS) 
       
       
53  Dostie (2005)  Fra  panel of 989,215 employment spells in full-time jobs in the goods  
      and services sector, 1978-1996 (EAE/DADS) 
       
54  Dygalo and Abowd (2005)  Fra  panel of 332,246 private sector firms, and 813,633 matched  
      workers, 1976-1996 (DADS) 
       
       
55  Crepon et al. (2003)  Fra  panel of 77,868 firms, and over 3 million matched workers,  
      1994-1997 (BRN/DADS) 
56  Cingano (2003)  Italy  repeated cross-section of 1,320 workers in the manufacturing 
      sector, maximum age 37, 1975-1997 (INPS) 
57  Flabbi and Ichino (2001)  Italy  panel of 10,809 employees from a large bank, 1989-1995 
       
       
58  Lallemand et al. (2007)  Bel  cross-section of 34,969 workers and 1,498 firms, 1995 (SES and  
      SBS) 
       
59  Gelderblom et al. (2006)  Neth  cross-section of 3,223 firms, 2000 (OSA) 
       
       
60  Dohmen (2004)  Neth  panel of (all) 17,610 workers at an aircraft manufacturer (Fokker),  
      1987-1996 
61  van Ours, Stoeldraijer (2010)  Neth  panel of almost 13,941 firms with more than 4 employees,  
      2001-2005 (SSB, GBA, ABR, PS) 
62  Bayo-Moriones et al. (2004)  Esp  interview with 734 plant managers in the manufacturing industry, 
      concerning blue-collar workers, 1997 
       
63  Haegeland and Klette (1999)  Nor  panel of 7,122 manufacturing plants with at least 5 employees,  
      with matched worker data, 1986-1993 
       
64  Barth (1997)  Nor  cross-section of 2,321 workers in 549 private-sector firms, 1989 
       
       
65  Daveri and Maliranta (2007)  Fin  panel of 1,104 manufacturing plants from the forest, industrial  
      machinery, and electronics sectors, with matched workers,  
      1995-2002 (FLEED) 
       
       
66  Ilmakunnas, Maliranta (2007)  Fin  panel of 18,848 firms with 405,000 matched employees,  
      1995-2003 (FLEED) 
       
67  Dostie (2006)  Can  panel of 5,500 Canadian firms, and 78,864 matched workers,  
      1999-2002 (WES) 
         51 
Appendix A  Overview of empirical studies (continued) 
     
No.  Main finding(s)  Rationale or implication 
     
51  the spot market has a predominant influence on   relevance of implicit contracts seems to be limited 
   wages, i.e. wage rigidity seems to be limited   
52  returns to tenure range from close to zero (high school  returns to tenure are used as an incentive device to 
   dropouts) to substantial (2.5% a year for college   keep immobile workers at the firm; specific human 




returns to tenure are very small, and even negative for first 
few years 
 
supports job search and job matching as 
determinants of wage level and wage growth; firm-
specific capital seems to be unimportant 
54  productivity rises faster than earnings during the initial   authors regard results supportive of theory that  
   years of an employment spell; however, the earnings  workers prefer increasing earnings profiles; not 
   profile is steeper in the longer run, and slopes upward  human capital or incentive theories 
   even when productivity declines   
55  wage profile steeper than productivity profile; productivity  human capital theory of little use in explaining wage 
   and experience are not related above age 35  formation above age 35; incentive theory might be  
56  high returns to tenure  supports human capital theory 
      
57  productivity is not the driving force of the observed   incentive theory might be (part of) the reason 
   upward sloping wage/seniority profiles; however it    
   might be for low level jobs   
58  positive relationship between within-firm wage dispersion   in line with the 'tournament' models  
   and firm productivity; stronger effect for firms with (i) many   
   blue-collar workers and (ii) high degree of monitoring   
59  wages do not follow the sharp drop in relative productivity   incentive theory; stimulate firm-specific capital  
   after age 55; young workers are paid more than their  accumulation by young workers 
   productivity   
60  performance determines the steepness of individual  upward-sloping tenure profiles reflect both deferred  
   wage-tenure profiles  compensation and improvements in productivity 
61  small wage-productivity gap for older workers  incentive theory might be (part of) the reason 
      
62  firms that offer seniority-based pay are less likely to   support to (implicit) incentive theory 
   employ piece rates, less likely to invest in monitoring    
   devices, more engaged in long relationships   
63  experienced workers are paid more than their relative   support to (implicit) incentive theory 
   productivity; workers with less than 15 years of    
   experience are underpaid   
64  support for tenure effect, but it is however negligible for   support to (implicit) incentive theory; no support for  
   piece-rate workers; employees with much firm-specific  the (specific) human capital explanation of seniority  
   human capital have less steep wage profiles  wages 
65  productivity and wage profiles differ in the electronics   consistent with the deferred compensation  
   sector; the discrepancy is mainly by tenure; in 'average'   hypothesis for high-tech plants but not for the other 
   industries both productivity and wages keep rising, either   industries; inconsistent with human capital theories 
   with tenure (forest) or with experience (industrial    
   machinery)   
66  unlike other labour flows, separations of older workers   consistent with the deferred compensation  
   (50+) has a strong positive impact on profitability, in   hypothesis, and with older workers having more  
   particular in the manufacturing ICT industry  bargaining power than others (e.g. as result of EPL) 
67  productivity is diminishing faster than wages for workers   incentive theory might be (part of) the reason 
   aged 55 and over; in particular for men with at least an    
   undergraduate degree      52 
 
Appendix A  Overview of empirical studies (continued) 
       
No.  Study  Country  Data 
       
68  Seltzer and Merrett (2000)  Aus  panel of 950 white-collar workers at a bank (Union Bank of  
      Australia), 1850s-1940s 
69  Serneels (2005)  Ghana  cross-section of 666 workers and 82 firms, 2000 (Ghana  
      Manufacturing Enterprise Survey) 
       
70  Hellerstein and Neumark (1995)  Israel  cross-section of 933 firms, 1988 (Industrial Survey and Survey of  
      the Labor Force in Industry) 
 
   53 
 
Appendix A  Overview of empirical studies (continued) 
     
No.  Main finding(s)  Rationale or implication 
     
68  wage grows with tenure; important late-career wage  evidence supports both firm-specific investments 
   growth, and mandatory retirement  (when young) and incentive pay (when older) 
69  wage and productivity profiles are similar in small and   human capital theory important in small firms; contract  
   non-unionized firms; wage profile steeper in large and   theory more relevant in institutionalized environments 
   unionized firms   
70  both earnings and productivity profiles upward sloping;  most consistent with the general human capital model; 
   they are statistically indistinguishable  however other theories cannot be rejected 
 
   54 
       